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This thesis examines the Command, Control and Communica-
tions procedures of an amphibious assault wave. The exam-
ination is preformed by the presentation of a model of the
communication networks of a wave. Computer simulation
results of the model are presented as an examination of the
model's parameter sensitivity. Modifications and further
extensions of the basic model are also discussed. The model
presented was originally designed for the LVTP7 tracked
amphibious personnel carrier, the vehicle presently in the
U.S. Marine Corps inventory. The model was also adapted to
defined design parameters of the Landing Vehicle Assault
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ship-to-shore movement of the assault infantry
elements of a Marine Amphibious Operation,- is provided by
the amphibian vehicles of the U.S. Marine Corps in a
coordinated and disciplined sequence of landings. Command
and control of this exercise is enhanced by experience and
expertise gained through training and rehearsal. However,
no matter how prepared the command structure may be, an
open channel for command, control and communication is
vital for success in all contingencies. The purpose of this
thesis is to examine the command control and communication
procedures of the U.S. Marine Corps amphibian vehicles in
the ship-to-shore phase of an amphibian assault.
The examination of this subject will involve the present
amphibian vehicle (LVTP7 Tractor) in the U.S. Marine Corps
inventory, and the proposed vehicle design of the future
(Landing Vehicle Assault, LVA) . The LVTP7 tractor is a
tracked vehicle using water jet propulsion in the waterborne
mode to provide speeds of 6 to 8 miles per hour for the
ship-to-shore transit. The LVA will also provide tracked
vehicle capability ashore, but will be required to transit
open seas in excess of 20 miles per hour.
The command, control and communication system is
composed of the personnel, equipment, communication links
and command relationships. A wave of amphibian vehicles

is a group of vehicles which transits ship-to-shore as a
single unit and lands on their assigned beaches simultaneously.
The wave is the smallest tactical unit in the amphibious
assault, and is under the tactical command of a wave
commander
.
When describing a wave of vehicles, their responsibilities
and their physical orientation to each other, the terms
spacing and detection sector angle are used. Figure 1
illustrates these two terms. Spacing of the vehicles is
measured in meters. Detection sector angle is measured in
degree (Note that the detection sector angle is bisected
by the center line of the vehicle)
.
The spacing of the vehicles in the wave defines lanes
for each vehicle, a lane being one spacing in width. Each
vehicle attempts to maintain position in the center of its
lane. If a vehicle must maneuver within its lane to avoid
an obstacle, then the vehicle requires a maneuver time.
This time to maneuver is the time from the receipt and
understanding of the order to maneuver, by the driver, to the
instant the vehicle has completely responded by performing
the required maneuver. The greatest maneuver time will be
the time required for the vehicle to cease forward move-
ment, that is, become dead in the water.
The chain of command within an assault wave consists
of the wave commander, a crew chief for each vehicle and










the movement of all vehicles in his wave from ship-to-shore
and for their subsequent land operations. He is responsible
primarily for the completion of his assigned mission and also
for the health and safety of his crews and embarked
personnel
.
A crew chief is the individual responsible for the
over-all operation of his vehicle, either waterborne or on
land. He is responsible for his vehicle accomplishing its
part of the wave's mission and for the health and safety
of all embarked personnel. The crew chief consults the wave
commander, when time permits, before executing individual
maneuvers. However, the crew chief is responsible for the
performance of his vehicle.
The vehicle driver is the individual whose actions affect
the vehicle directly. The -driver acts on directions from
the crew chief, and in all cases requests directions when
he detects a situation which he believes needs attention.
The command relationships, data inputs, response out-
puts, and links between the wave commander, a crew chief, and
a vehicle driver are shown in Figure 2. From Figure 2 the
communication links within the wave are readily apparent.
Intercom communication exists between the driver and the
crew chief of each vehicle. The wave commander and the
crew chiefs communicate over the wave radio net, or by


































outside the wave is limited to the wave commander's
monitoring of radio transmissions between the wave's guide
boat (U.S. Navy) and the primary control ship. These naval
vessels are responsible for guiding the wave to the line of
departure, the point at which the assault begins.
The amphibious assault, although executed many times,
has never been modeled with particular attention paid to
the command, control and communications links. This thesis
examines this topic by the construction of a model of the
command, control and communications links of the ship-to-
shore movement of a wave. The model was then exercised to
identify those parameters which have a significant effect
on the command and control of the wave. Finally, the
model was exercised with different scenarios and system




A network simulation was used to represent the command,
control and communication links of the amphibian vehicle wave.
A network format reflects the structure of a total system
and its links in a transparent model. Nodes in this network
represent individual personnel, pieces of equipment, and
states (or conditions) the equipment or personnel may be in.
Activities that connect nodes link personnel and equipment
and provide the transit time to move from person-to-person,
state-to-state, or from one piece of equipment to another.
A simulation offers a possible glimpse of a real system
from start to finish with the opportunity to exercise all
alternatives. The simulation of this network provides a
trace from a starting point in the command structure,
through the communication links until all appropriate
activities have been completed. Enhancing the attractiveness
of this type of model was the availability of network
solving algorithms by computer simulation.
A. SCOPE
An objective of this thesis was to provide a basic
model from which expansion could be easily accomplished,
and which was flexible enough to adapt to different vehicle
characteristics, tactics and scenarios.
13

The wave, being the smallest tactical unit in the
amphibious assault, was chosen as the scope of the model.
A typical wave consists of ten vehicles. Since the on-line
formation is always used in at least a portion of the ship-
to-shore assault, that formation (physical relationship of
vehicles to each other) is modeled in this thesis. In the
on-line formation all ten vehicles travel abreast at a
predetermined spacing. Finally, the communications and
command structure modeled were restricted to include only
the vehicles within the wave, that is intervehicle and
intravehicle communication.
Various assumptions were made to provide generality and
to facilitate use of the model. All vehicles and their
inherent equipment were assumed to be homogeneous. Like-
wise, all like crew members of all vehicles were assumed
to have equal ability and similar training. These
assumptions provide a wave of ten identical vehicles with
ten identical crews
.
Key elements in the model are the times required to
accomplish various tasks. In recognition of the random
nature of these times, they were modeled as stochastic
variables. The time between opportunities at which a
vehicle's crew could detect an obstacle was assumed to be
exponential. This assumption provides a glimpse model,
with no memory of the last time the obstacle could have
been detected. The length of a message to be transmitted
14

through the communication links was assumed to be uniformly
distributed. These assumptions were made, purely to attempt
to capture the randomness of the time required to communicate
in the situation being modeled, and are not suggested to
correspond to what happens in the real world. Additional
operational testing is required to determine the actual
distributions
.
For the model of the LVTP7 tractor, the time required
to maneuver was assumed to be normally distributed. This
assumption was based on the test data from the Amphibian
Vehicle Test Basin at Camp Pendleton, California. Since no
prototype testing data was available for the proposed LVA,
the time required to maneuver was taken to be uniformly
distributed.
B. EXERCISING THE MODEL
To exercise the model the wave was confronted with a
crisis situation. An obstacle was positioned in the path of
the wave. The detection of the obstacle, communication of
this detection, if necessary, and the maneuvering of the
endangered vehicles, was presented as a simple test of the
command, control and communications links.
An integral part of this exercise is the detection of
the obstacle. In order to simulate detection of the
obstacle, a detection model was constructed. The detection
model used is similar to simplified detection models used
15

in land combat simulations. Since no data, as to the ability
to detect obstacles in amphibian vehicles, while waterborne,
was available this model was incorporated. The detection
model used in the thesis is
2
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION (Pdet) = l-exp(-A/R ),
Where A is a constant to be determined and R is the range
of the obstacle at the time of possible detection. The
range of the obstacle, R, is adjusted at each glimpse by
the distance travelled at the closing speed during the time
since the last glimpse. The time between glimpses was
assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable.
Only those vehicles whose detection sector included the
obstacle would have a glimpse of the obstacle. Once a
probability of detection, Pdet, on a glimpse was determined,
using the range of the obstacle from the vehicle, a random
number was generated to simulate the outcome of the chance
of detection. If the random number generated was less than
Pdet, the probability of detection, the obstacle was
detected by that vehicle at that time and range.
To set a threshold at which to base the detection
model and evaluate the constant A, it was decided that the
probability of detection, Pdet, given a glimpse, would be
0.15 at the maximum detection range. This provides a
detection model of the form illustrated in Figure 3. Note
that by varying the maximum detection range the probability
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The first network constructed was the network consisting
of the intercom and intravehicle communication between the
crew chief and the driver. Figure 4 displays this
communication subsystem with the individual communication
devices labeled. Failures in particular links between
devices were assumed to be random with probabilities of
failure for each link as input parameters. If the intercom
link is broken, an alternate voice communication link was
modeled to represent physical movement of the crew chief to
a position to speak directly and unaided, to the driver.
The next subsystem modeled was the communication by
radio from one vehicle to another. It was assumed that
the usage priorities of the radio receivers available in
the LVTP7 tractor would be
1. The crew chief would monitor transmissions on
his transmitter/receiver using antenna 1 until that
circuit is inoperable.
2. The crew chief would monitor either of his two
radio receivers (A or B) using antenna 2 when his primary
circuit is inoperable.
This assumption is for simulation only. since the hardware
configuration of the actual system enables the crew chief
to monitor all three receiving devices simultaneously.
Figure 5 shows the network of the intervehicle communication




























devices were assumed to be random with the probabilities of
failure as input parameters for each device.
Finally the network of the wave of ten vehicles and
their links was constructed. Figure 6 shows this network.
It should be noted that it is assumed that once a vehicle
detects an obstacle and determines it is not in his lane he
continues to attempt to communicate to the endangered
vehicle until he either communicates a warning or the
obstacle reaches the wave. Both of these events cause the
simulation to end. Appropriate modifications were made to
the above three networks to make them adaptable for computer
simulation and then the three networks were simulated.
21















































III. RESULTS OF MODEL SIMULATION
The computer simulation of the three networks was
accomplished through the use of Q-GERT. This language was
attrative due to its ability to accept the networks in data
form. In Q-GERT each node and activity are entered as
single sets of data. Also included in Q-GERT is the option
to write user defined functions. These functions can perform
logical branching or particular numerical calculations.
Reference 1 was the guide used in implementing Q-GERT to
simulate the networks. Appendix A contains a complete
program for simulating the radio network for the LVTP7
tractor, written in Q-GERTS.
This chapter summarizes the results of the Q-GERT
simulations for the three networks. In each case one
thousand replications were run. This was done in an attempt
to reduce the variance in the result of the simulation
and to stabilize the estimates.
A. INTERCOM MODEL RESULTS
The simulation of the intravehicle communication first
gave an estimate of the reliability of the intercom
subsystem. This was done to show the ability of the network
simulation to duplicate an analytical result, and to give
a basic model capable of accepting future modification if
the intercom subsystem changes. Figure 7 shows the network
23

and the random failure parameters used in the simulation.
The analytical reliability equation 6f that network is
(0.95)x(0.95)x(0.95) = 0.857375 .
The results of the network simulation gave an overall
reliability estimate of the intercom of 0.848. The length
of a message was assumed uniformly distributed in time
with a minimum message length of 8.0 seconds and a maximum
of 12.0 seconds. It was found through simulation to take
an average of 16.62 seconds, with variance 3.78, to get a
message from the crew chief to the driver. As shown in
Figure 7 the driver understands 90 percent of all messages
he receives and requests a repeat of any message not
understood.
B. RADIO NETWORK MODEL RESULTS
The Q-GERTS simulation of the radio network model supplied
an estimate of the overall subsystem reliability. As in the
case of the intercom network this simulation was performed,
in part, to validate the network representation of an
otherwise analytical reliability determination. But more
importantly it was done to provide a basic network model of
the radio communication between vehicles that could handle
































Figure 8 shows the network and the probability of
failure parameters used in the simulation. The analytic
solution to the system's reliability is
Antenna 1 (0.9)x(0.9) = 0.81
plus
Antenna 2 (0 . 19) x (0 . 95) x (0 . 995) = 0.179
(0.995 is the reliability of receivers A and B)
This yields a 0.9895 probability of reaching the crew chief
who understands 90 percent of all messages received. This
results in a total system reliability of 0.940025. The
result of simulating one message travelling through the
network and all of its possible branches gave an estimate of
system reliability of 0.939. Using a message length of
uniform distribution between 8.0 and 12.0 seconds, the
simulation estimated an average of 31.58 seconds, with
variance 10.19, to get a message from a sender to the crew
chief. Again a reliability of 0.9 of understanding a
radio transmission was an input parameter value (see
Figure 8)
.
C. WAVE NETWORK RESULTS
The network of the ten vehicle wave was simulated for
the LVTP7 tractor and for the LVA. The results of each
vehicle's sensitivity to parameter value changes are shown
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effectiveness used in the parameter sensitivity study was
the probability the obstacle was avoided. This probability
is a direct reflection of the ability of the wave not only
to detect the obstacle, but also to communicate, if necessary,
to the endangered vehicles. Then sufficient time for
corrective actions, maneuver time, must be available for the
endangered vehicle if the obstacle was to be avoided. It
was assumed in these simulations that the obstacle was
stationary and the closing velocity of the obstacle was
solely a function of the speed of the wave.
Figure 9 thru 16 each list the specific parameter
values used in each simulation. Vehicle spacing and maximum
detection range are measured in meters. Wave speed is
measured in miles per hour. The probability of detection,
Pdet, is in terms of the probability of detection at the
defined maximum detection range.
It is important to remember that all results presented
must be examined for trends only. The significance of
any particular result (data point) is confined to the
assumptions and scope of the model. Linear interpolations
were constructed between data points to highlight the trends
of the simulation results.
1. LVTP7 Parameter Sensitivity
Figures 9 thru 12 present graphically the results of
the simulations for parameter sensitivity of the ten tractor
28

wave. Changes in detection sector angle (Figure 9), maximum
detection range (Figures 10 and 11) , and vehicle spacing
(Figure 12) were simulated individually. One general trend
is noted, the faster the wave moves the lower the probability
of avoiding the obstacle. One deviation from this trend
is found in Figure 10. This deviation can be attributed to
the inherent variability of simulation estimates. The
results shown in Figures 9 thru 12 echo the standard
operating practices of the LVTP7 tractor wave during
waterborne operations. That is, when visibility is a
problem (i.e. detection capability decreased) the wave
formation is slowed and the vehicle spacing tightened. This
'logical' observation tends to partially validate the model.
2 . LVA Parameter Sensitivity
The modeling of the proposed vehicle, LVA, involved
three changes to the model of the LVTP7 wave. First, it
was necessary to increase the speed of the ten vehicle wave.
Next the detection time was shortened, due to the higher
speed, and the maneuver time was examined as a parameter of
significance. Figures 13 thru 16 display the results of the
network simulations performed for the LVA wave, using four
different sets of parameters values.
The trend found in the results of the LVTP7 wave
simulation is even more noticeable for the LVA simulation.
That is, the higher the speed of the wave the lower the
29
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probability the obstacle is avoided. Figures 13 thru 16
also indicate that at maximum detection ranges under 250
meters there is much more sensitivity of the probability
of the obstacle being avoided with the higher speed.
Especially in the case of the LVA, significance
cannot be attached to any single data point except within
the strict limitations of the model, since the LVA was
modeled as an LVTP7 tractor with a higher speed in the
water. Also, the speed differential between the LVA and
the LVTP7, does not seem to explain the observed difference
in magnitude of the simulation results. The difference
in magnitude appears to be larger than the proportional
difference in the two vehicles' speed.
It is apparent from the simulation results of the LVA
wave, that there is a need for the LVA to have enhanced
detection capability. The results shown in Figures 9
thru 16 suggest possible ways to enhance detection capability
and obstacle avoidance. First, by decreasing the vehicle
spacing the wave's ability to avoid obstacles increases.
Next, an alternate communication means must be available
as a standby for radio communication within the wave.
Such an alternate communication means was exercised in the
model for the LVA wave, but the actual system to be used
is unknown. The LVA wave must also use its speed of
advance to best accomplish the mission, but also offer the
34
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wave the most opportunity to detect and avoid obstacles.
The ability of the LVA vehicle crews to increase or
decrease their detection sectors is unknown as of now. Also,
the use of optical or other navigational aids is not known.
The increased vulnerability to obstacles of the LVA wave,
due to its speed, is apparent, but, as mentioned above,
the solution to the problem may be found in tactical




IV. FLEXIBILITY OF THE MODEL
The flexibility of the basic model is examined in this
chapter in two ways, modifications of the basic model and
possible extensions of the model. Simulations were run
for the modifications explained below. The possible
extensions of the model are discussed as a guide to future
model use.
A. MODEL MODIFICATIONS
Three modifications to the basic model were developed
and simulated. In the first modification, the three
networks were combined to form a detailed network of the
wave. In the second modification an environment which
allowed no radio communication was simulated. Finally, in
the third modification the three basic networks were
chained together. The simulation results of the three
individual networks formed the links of the chain. These
results from one network were used as the input parameter
values of the next network in the chain.
1 . Detailed Communication Network
In the first modification, the intervehicle
communication network (Figure 5) and the wave network
(Figure 6) were combined to give a more detailed communica-
tion portion to the wave network. This detailed communica-
tion network for the wave allows the user to input the
40

reliability of all communications equipment in the system.
The simulation of this network produces a trace of message
traffic thru the entire command, control, and communications
system. Such a degree of resolution may be required to
evaluate the contribution of a particular piece of
equipment to the overall ability of the wave to perform.
Simulations were made with the detailed communication
network. The results of these simulations were compared
with those of the basic wave communication model. For the
wave of LVTP7 tractors- and the parameter sets examined, the
detailed communication network displayed the same trends of
parameter sensitivity. However, in all cases the probability
of avoiding the obstacle was lower. This can be attributed
to a lower overall communication reliability for the radio
links when the detailed network was used. Figure 17 shows
the difference in magnitude and similarities in the trend of
the basic wave network and the detailed communication network,
2 . No-Radio Communication
The basic model was also modified by removing the
radio communication capability. This modification may
represent a hostile electronic warfare environment (jamming)
or a radio silence restriction imposed by the command
structure of the amphibious wave. This modification forces
heavy reliance on the alternate communication means employed.
In the case of the present vehicle, the LVTP7 tractor, the
41

COMPARISON OF SIMULATION RESULTS
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alternate communication means consists of arm and hand
signals relayed from vehicle to vehicle in the wave.
The modification to the basic wave communication
network was to use the alternate communication links
between nodes at all times. The simulation of this modified
network used a length of message of 10 to 30 seconds. As
in the previous simulations the chance of understanding
a transmitted message was input to be 90 percent. Again,
one thousand replications of the network were simulated.
The results of this simulation, when compared to results
of the basic wave network, all other parameter values held
constant, showed the no-radio communication network to
produce a higher probability of avoiding the obstacle. The
two results were 0.926 for the no-radio communication
network and 0.914 for the basic wave network. This difference
can be attributed to the single communication circuit of the
alternate communication means, which is always operable.
3 . Chained Networks
The final modification of the basic model was to
chain the three basic networks together in an output-to-
input chain. Figure 18 shows the arrangement of the three
networks in the chain. It can be seen in Figure 18 how one
network's simulation results becomes part of the input
parameter values of the next network. This chained network
simulation is attractive when limited computer resources
43



































are available. When resources prevent progress through
the chain past a certain point, the simulation results at
that point can be held for input to the next point in the
chain when feasible.
The chained network simulation also allows intermediate
results to be checked for reasonableness. Once one
network has been simulated the results can be validated
prior to proceeding farther down the chain. The final
result of the chained network simulation is a detailed
communication network with a high degree of resolution,
since all three networks were used.
B. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
The modifications described above were performed to
show the ability of the model to adjust to different user
requirements. Other modifications are possible, but due to
limited time and operational data they were not examined
in this thesis. Nevertheless, they are outlined below to
point out possible future studies using the basic model.
The scope of the model could be extended to include
more than one wave. The communication between waves and
the associated naval vessels or aircraft could be
incorporated in the model. The basic formation of the wave
could be changed from the on-line formation to any other
tactical arrangement of vehicles.
45

The method of exercising the model may be changed.
Instead of obstacle avoidance, perhaps vehicle damage or
casualties would generate the requirement for exercising
the communication links of the wave. In that case a new
measure of effectiveness would need to be developed to
measure the ability of the communication networks to
perform.
The parameter values of the model could be modified to
reflect individuality of each vehicle. For example,
different vehicles in the wave would have different detection
sector angles. A study could then be done to find optimal
mixes of detection sectors. The benefits of employing
optical devices to aid detection could also be examined





At the outset of this thesis the goal was to develop a
model of the command, control and communication system in
the ship-to-shore movement of an amphibious wave and to
exercise the model to determine those parameters to which
the model was sensitive. An additional goal in this thesis
was to examine parameter sensitivity to changes in vehicle
characteristics. The model proved capable of accepting
parameter values for the proposed LVA based on present
design specifications. Then through simulation the results
were found that gave indications of possible problem areas
for the LVA. Of course, the exact values of the results
are perhaps not meaningful, but the trends displayed in
Figures 13 thru 16 indicate the need for the LVA to have an
enhanced detection capability to compliment its increased
speed capability.
Within the limitations of time and available data, a
simple and flexible model was developed to meet the
expectations. To complete the examination of the model,
the advantages and disadvantages of the model are discussed




A. ADVANTAGES OF THE MODEL
The network simulations used in the model have several
advantages in examining parameter sensitivity. The networks
are transparent to the observer and the observer can see the
system in as much detail as he desires. All personnel,
pieces of equipment and states that the command structure
occupies in time are represented in the networks. Networks
are inherently flexible and this was shown in the
modifications explained in Chapter IV.
The simulation model allows us, the user, to replicate
real-world exercises. The simulation of each network
separately or the simulation of combined networks offers
a choice to the model user, depending upon his needs, of
what degree of resolution of the system to compare to the
real world. Simulation also offers the model user the
ability to change any parameter value and get immediate
results for comparison to real data for validation.
The model presented in this thesis is simple, with few
assumptions. This simplicity makes it easy to validate the
model. The model also may become a base from which a more
complex model may be built.
B. DISADVANTAGES OF THE MODEL
The main disadvantage of the model is that there is no
exact answer produced for interpretation. All simulation
results are sensitive to input parameter values and the
48

outcomes of simulating random events. The results of the
model must be examined for trends only. Significance can
not be placed on the magnitude of any one simulation result.
The dependence on automated network simulation (computer
simulation) is another disadvantage. The memory space
(core size) required to store and solve the networks is
expensive. To stabilize results, a large number of
replications of the simulation is required. This computer
time usage is also expensive. In short, to gain more
reliable results, of large networks, large expenditures of
computer time and core space are necessary.
C. DATA FOR MODEL VALIDATION
Once the prospective model user has decided to use the
model presented he must provide the data, input parameter
values, to validate the model. Then, if the model is
applicable, run the model with the desired input parameter
values. Many different input parameters were discussed in
this examination of the amphibious assault wave. The
required type, form, and quantity of input parameters are
discussed below.
Three basic types of data are required by the model.
Reliability information of components, communication means
and their time to transmit messages, and a vehicle's
maneuvering characteristics in the waterborne mode must
be input. Also, an appropriate detection model must be
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incorporated if the present model is not satisfactory.
The appropriate location for each parameter value is
evident in the networks presented. Appendix A, the sample
Q-GERTS simulation program, is well documented as to the
location of parameter value inputs.
The form in which the data is accepted depends upon its
type. Reliability data should reflect the probability of
the component operating for a period of time equal to the
mission length. This single number probability can be
either manufacturer's specification or field test data.
The transmission times for communication by different means
and a vehicle's maneuver time can be defined by probability
mass distributions or single value estimates. If the
available data conforms to known probability mass functions
or to any fitted curve, the Q-GERTS algorithms can accept
the data by parameterizing the curve.
The quantity of the data will be determined by the
prospective model user. The varying of parameter values
to reflect different scenarios is one determining factor,
since only one set of parameter values is reflected in a
single simulation result. Accuracy of the input parameter
values also affects the quantity of data needed. To refine
the estimates of the input parameter values, a larger data
base is normally required.
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D. FINAL NOTE TO THE PROSPECTIVE MODEL USER
The purpose of this thesis was to develope a basic,
flexible and solvable model of the ship-to-shore phase of
an amphibious assault. A model was developed, exercised
and presented with the results discussed. The advantages,
disadvantages, modifications and possible extensions of
the model were also discussed. The prospective user of this
model should take this entire examination into consideration
before deciding upon using this model. The decision on
whether to use the model or not should be weighed with





SAMPLE Q-GERTS SIMULATION PROGRAM




























CCMXON /GVAP/ NDE , NFT EU ( 100 ) ,NR EL { 100 )
,
NREL F ( 100) ,




MAXIMUM DETECTION RANGE IN METERS
DIST=200.0
SPEED OF THE OBSTACLE IN METERS/SECOND
SPEED=3.11
VEHICLE SPACING IN METERS
SF=50.0




















CCMMON /QVAR/ NDE ,N FTBU ( 100 )
,
NREL ( 100 ) , NREL F ( 100 )
,
1MR EL 2(100) ,NRUN,NRUNS,NTC(100) » PAR4M( 100 ,4) ,TBEG, TNCh
CCMMON/ SPECS/ CIST, IS EED,P OS I T,SPEEC,SP, TFEA1A,LANE
REAL*4 LLiy
UF=0.0
GC TO ( 1,2, 2), IFN
USER FUNCTION ONE
LCCATE PRESENT DISTANCE OF OBSTACLE FROM ThE fcAVE
DNOW=DI ST-(TNOW* SPEED) -1.0
LLIM=SP*( GATRB(l)+0.5)-(DN0w*TANUhEATA/2.0))

















CETERMINE IF THE OESTACLE IS IN THE AREA OF CETECTION
IF (POSIT. GE.LLIM .AND. POSIT. LE.RLIM) GO TO 11
UF=O.0
RETURN










IS THE OBSTACLE IN THIS LANE










*** NETWORK CATA CARCS ***
GEN, NARK -COST A, WAVE-NET ,2, 25, 1978,1, 3 , 1,, 1000, , ,6,7 50*
*** NODES ***
SEARCHES D5TECTICN SECTOR






VEHICLE 8 SEARCHES DETECTICN SECTOR
VEHICLE <5 SEARCHES DETECTICN SECTOR
S0U,10,C,1,A* VEHICLE 10 SEARCHES DETECTION SECTOR
REG, 11,1,1,0* DETECTION HAS BEEN MADE
REG, 12, 1, 1, A* IS THE OBSTACLE IN NY LANE?
REG,13,1,,D* THE OBSTACLE IS IN MY L£NE
REG,2Q,1,1,P* IS MY RADIO OPERATIONAL!
SOU, ItClfA* VEHICLE 1
SOU, 2, 0,1, A* VEHICLE 2
SOU, 2, 0,1, A* VEHICLE 3
S0U,4,C,1,A* VEHICLE 4
SOL, 5, 0,1,A* VEHICLE 5
SOU, 6, 0,1, A* VEHICLE 6










ACT ,5,11,CC»0 ,15, , ,A2.EC.1.0*
ACT,6,ll,CO,0,16,,,A2.EC.l.C*
ACT, 7, ll,CO,0 ,17, , ,A2.EC.1.0*
ACT tSfllfCCtOtlSr , ,A2.EC1.0*
ACT, ?, 11, CO, 0,19, , ,A2.EQ.1.0*
ACT,1C,11,C0,0,20,,,A2.EQ.1 .0* DETECTICN MADE
ACT, 11, 12, CO, C, 21*
ACT, 12, 13, CO, C,22,,,A3.EQ.1.0* OBSTACLE IS IN MY LANE
ACT, 12, 20, CC,0, 23,,, A3. EC. 0.0* OBSTACLE IS IN ANCTHER LANE
ACT, 13, 9€, NO, 2, 24* TIME TO MANEUVER A VEHICLE
ACT , 20,21, NC, 3,25, ,0.9* LENGTH OF MESSAGE TRANSMITTED
MY RADIO IS DCloN
HIS RADIO IS OPERATIONAL
HIS RADIO 15 CCWN
HE DOES NOT LNCERSTAND
TINE TO MANEUVER A VEHICLE
REQUEST REPEAT CF INSTUCTICN
ACT, 20, 30, CO, 0,26,,0. 1*
ACT, 21,22, CO, 0,27 ,,0.9*
ACT, 21, 30, UN, 4,28, ,0.1*
ACT, 22, 23, CO, 0,29, ,0.1*
AC T, 22, 99 , NO, 2,30 ,,0.9*
ACT, 23, 20, UN, 4, 31*
ACT ,30,31, NC, 3,32* TIME TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE
ACT»21t«StNG, 2, 33, ,0.9* TIME TO MANELVEF A VEHICLE
ACT , 21, 30, UN, 4,34, ,0.1* RECUEST REPEAT CF INSTRUCTION
ACT,£G,£1,UF,3,35* TIME FCR OBSTACLE TO REACH THE WAVE
ACT, 11 ,97,C0,0,36*
*** PARAMETERS ***
PAR, 1,30, 10, 120* TIME BETWEEN GLIMPSES
PAR, 2, 11. 6, 10, 13, 1.2* TIME TO MANEUVER A VEHICLE
PAR, 3, 15, 10,30,4* LENGTH OF RADIO MESSAGE TRANSMITTED




REG,21,1,1,P* IS HIS RADIO OPERATIONAL?
REG, 22, 1,1 ,P* AR£ HIS RADIO CIRCUITS OPERATIONAL?
REG, 23 ,1 ,1,D* HIS RADIO IS DOWN
REG, 30 ,1,1, D* COMMUNICATE BY ALTERNATE MEANS
REG ,31 ,1,1, P* IS THE MESSAGE UNCERSTOOC?
SOU, 80, C,,D* THE OBSTACLE EEGINS TO APPROACH THE WAVE
SIN, 81/TCC-LATE, 1,,D* THE OBSTACLE REACHES THE WAVE
STA ,S7/DETECT ,1 , ,D* THE OBSTACLE IS CETECTED TIME
SIN,9S/Cfcl\-LANE,1,,D* THE GBSTACLE IS AVOIDED IN MY LANE
SIN,99/CCM-MADE,1,,D* ENCANGERED VEHICLE COMTACTEC IN TIME
VAS,1, 1,C0, 1, 2, UF,1*
VAS,2,1,C0,2,2,UF,1*
VAS ,3,1 ,C0,3,2, UF,1*
VAS, 4, 1,C0,4, 2,UF,1*
VAS ,5,1,C0,5,2,UF,1*
VAS, 6,1, CO, 6, 2, UF, 1*
VAS, 7, 1,C0,7,2,UF ,1*
VAS ,£,1 ,CC,8,2,UF,1*
VAS ,5,1 ,C0,9,2,UF, 1*
VAS, 10,1, CO, 10, 2, UF ,1*
VAS, 12, 3, UF, 2*
*** ACTIVITIES ***
ACT ,1,1,EX, 1,1, ,,A2. EQ.O.O*
ACT ,2 ,2 ,EX,1,2,,,A2. EQ.O.O*
ACT ,3, 3,EX, 1,3, , ,A2. E Q. 0.0*
ACT ,4,4 ,EX,1 ,4, , ,A2. EQ.O.O*
ACT ,5, 5, EX, 1,5,, ,42. EQ.O.O*
ACT, 6, 6,E X, If 6tt ,A2. EQ. 0.0*
ACT ,7, 7,EX, 1,7,,, A2. EQ.O.O*
ACT ,fi,8,EX,l ,8, , ,42.. EQ.O.O*
TIME TO NEXT GLIMPSE
TIME TC NEXT GL IMP SE
TIME TO NEXT GLIMPSE
TIME TC NEXT GL IMP SE
TIME TC NEXT GLIMPSE
TI ME TC NEXT GLIMPSE
TIME TC NEXT GLIMPSE
TIME TC NEXT GLIMPSE
TIME TO NEXT GLI MPSEACT ,9,9 ,EX, 1,9, ,,A2. EQ.O.O*
ACT,10,1C,EX,1 ,10 ,,,A2.EC.0.0* TIME TC NEXT GLIMPSE
ACT, 1,11, CC,0, 11, ,,A2. EC. 1.0* OETECTICN MADE
ACT ,2, 11,CO, 0,12, ,,A2.EQ. 1.0* DETECTION MADE
ACT,3 ,11,C0,0 ,13, ,,A2.EC. 1.0* CETECTICN MADE
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